Alauddin Khalji

Lore & Background

Alauddin's courtier Amir Khusrau states that Alauddin's objective was the welfare of the general public. However, Ziauddin Barani (c. 1357), the main source of information about the reforms, states that the Sultan's objective was to subjugate the Hindus and to maintain an unprecedentedly large army (the low prices would make low salaries acceptable for the soldiers). Barani provides a numbered list of Alauddin's regulations, but his account does not contain the verbatim text of the royal orders. Barani has reproduced the regulations from his memory, organizing them in a logical sequence. Alauddin's administration fixed the price of grains in Delhi: wheat at 7.5 jitals per sir, barley at 4 jitals, gram at 5 jitals, rice at 5 jitals, and pulses (mash, mung, moth) at 3 jitals per sir. The prices were lower in smaller towns. Both Khusrau and Barani state that the prices were not allowed to increase during Alauddin's lifetime, even when the rainfall was scarce.

Reader's Guide

Alauddin implemented price control measures by setting up the following types of markets in Delhi: Mandi, the central grain market, plus grocery shops in every neighbourhood; Sera-i Adl, the central market for manufactured commodities and imported goods; markets for slaves and animals; and general markets for other commodities. He appointed Malik Qabul Ulugh Khani as controller of the grain markets, and a friend of Malik Qabul as an assistant controller. The Sultan granted Malik Qabul extensive territories as iqta', and placed a large cavalry and infantry under his charge. Alauddin also appointed one of his own close associates as an intelligence officer of the grain market. The controller strictly regulated the market prices, and informed Alauddin of any violations. The government strictly punished the shopkeepers who tried to sell goods above the regulated price, and those who tried to cheat by using false weights. Alauddin's administration set up granaries, and stocked them with grain collected from the peasants. According to Barani, the government's share of the grain in the crown territory (khalisa) in the Doab region was collected in kind, and taken to the government-run granaries in Delhi. In the Jhain region, half of the government's share was collected in kind and taken to the Jhain town; when needed, the stores were transferred to the government-run granaries in Delhi. The stores in the government-run granaries were released and sold at fixed price during the times of scarcity. Alauddin's administration mandated registration for the transporters who bought the farming produce from the peasants and carried it to the towns. The government banned hoarding, and held the transporters, their agents and their families collectively responsible for any violations. Alauddin placed the transporters under the controller of the grain market. His administration arrested the former leaders of the transporters, and handed them over to the controller, Malik Qabul. Alauddin asked Malik Qabul to keep them in chains until they collectively agreed to abide by certain conditions imposed on them, and gave sureties for each other. These conditions required the transporters to adhere to Alauddin's regulations. The transporters were also ordered to settle in the villages at specific distances along the Yamuna River, so as to ensure rapid transport of grains to Delhi. They were required to bring their families, cattle and goods to their new residences. A supervisor was appointed to oversee their operations. According to Barani, because of these changes, the transporters brought so much grain to Delhi that no releases were required from the government-run granaries. Alauddin banned regrating, the practice of buying goods at a lower price and selling them at a higher price. All the government officials in the Ganga-Yamuna Doab region were required to guarantee that they would not permit any regrating in their area of authority. If any regrating was discovered in a particular territory, the officials in-charge were answerable to the throne. The regrated grain was confiscated by the government, and the violator was severely punished. According to Barani, such regulations made it impossible for a merchant, a peasant, a grocer or anyone else to sell even minute quantities of grains above the regulated price. Alauddin's administration allowed the cultivators to take limited quantity of grain from fields to their homes for personal consumption. Alauddin required his revenue officers to sign written agreements promising that they would take severe measures to ensure that the cultivators in the Doab region were unable to take the surplus grain to their houses for regrating. This would force the cultivators to sell the grain to the transporters at low prices. Barani states that the cultivators were also given the option of taking the surplus grain to the market themselves, and selling it there for a profit, at the prices fixed by Alauddin. Firishta clarifies that the cultivators could sell the grain at the markets in the nearest town: they were not required to visit the central market in Delhi. Alauddin sought daily reports about the grain market from three independent sources: the market superintendent, the intelligence officers, and the secret spies. The 16th-century chronicler Firishta states that although Alauddin was illiterate at...

Did You Know?

• Alauddin fixed the price of wheat at 7.5 jitals per sir, barley at 4 jitals, gram at 5 jitals, rice at 5 jitals, and pulses at 3 jitals per sir.
• The prices were not allowed to increase during Alauddin's lifetime, even when the rainfall was scarce.
• Alauddin banned regrating, the practice of buying goods at a lower price and selling them at a higher price.
• Alauddin sought daily reports about the grain market from three independent sources: the market superintendent, the intelligence officers, and the secret spies.
• The reforms were revoked shortly after Alauddin's death by his son Qutbuddin Mubarak Shah.

Ethnic Origins and the Question of Identity

The Khalji dynasty's roots trace back to a Turkic people called the Khalaj, who migrated alongside the Huns and Hephthalites from Central Asia into what is now southern and eastern Afghanistan as early as 660 CE. This layered heritage made their ethnic classification a matter of persistent scholarly debate. André Wink argued the Khaljis were a Turkicized remnant of early Indo-European nomads who later merged with Afghan populations, while C. E. The eleventh-century scholar Mahmud al-Kashgari notably placed them among 'Turkman' groups—those who appeared Turkic in dress and language but did not belong to the original Turkish stock. What the sources make clear is that contemporaries at the Delhi court drew a sharp line between Khaljis and Turks, treating them as a separate people. This distinction proved politically explosive when the Khaljis moved to seize the sultanate from the established Turkish ruling elite, an act that one historian has called a revolution in the very composition of power.

The Khalji Revolution and Alauddin's Path to the Throne

The Khaljis entered Delhi's political scene as minor vassals serving the Mamluk sultanate under Balban. When Balban dismantled the power of the Forty—his insubordinate Turkish officers—he inadvertently weakened the very Turkish nobility that had kept non-Turkish factions in check, creating a dangerous opening. Jalal-ud-din Firuz Khalji, a man in his seventies known for his gentle disposition toward common people, ascended the throne in January 1290. Yet his rule remained fragile: he faced a revolt by Balban's nephew, an unsuccessful campaign against Ranthambhor, and relied on an Afghan enclave at Kilokhri as his effective capital. Alauddin, Jalal-ud-din's nephew and son-in-law, had returned from a plundering raid on Deogiri in the Deccan, killed his uncle, and claimed the sultanate for himself.

Military Conquests and Territorial Expansion

Alauddin's reign marked the Delhi Sultanate's greatest territorial reach, achieved through a relentless series of military campaigns. His first major test came in 1298 at the Battle of Jaran-Manjur, where he repelled a significant Mongol invasion. That victory was pivotal: it cemented his authority and gave him the prestige to consolidate his hold on the throne. From there, expansion accelerated. The Sultan's ambitions then pushed deep into South India, with commanders like Kafur and Khusraw Khan extracting enormous war booty from defeated kingdoms. A structured fiscal system underpinned these campaigns: generals collected ghanima and remitted khums, a one-fifth share, to the Sultan's treasury, directly funding the Khalji state's military machine.

Building the Khalji State: Administration and Power Structures

Alauddin understood that conquest alone could not sustain a sultanate. Upon taking power, he immediately surrounded himself with a cadre of loyal appointees who would form the backbone of his government. This was not merely a personal retinue; it represented a deliberate restructuring of the state's administrative machinery. The Khalji period, spanning roughly 1290 to 1320, saw the Delhi Sultanate undergo significant military, administrative, and economic reforms that transformed it from a fragile post-Mamluk polity into the most extensive power the subcontinent had seen under that dynasty. The revenue system tied to military campaigns—where khums on ghanima flowed directly into the Sultan's coffers—created a self-reinforcing cycle of conquest and state-building. Alauddin's reign thus stands as the high-water mark of Khalji ambition, the period when the dynasty's territorial and institutional reach was at its zenith.